We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a … impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical … partly affects cooperation. While there is no positive democracy effect when the institution is implemented, the vote …

This paper examines whether an institution has a differing impa ct on cooperation if it is introduced by a … effects arising from the democratic policy choice. I find evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously … implemented institutions lead to m ore cooperation than iden- tical exogenous institutions. Especially the subjects who i nitially …

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of … quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with … of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect …

Throughout human history, informal sanctions played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of … quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with … of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect …

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of … two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different … key to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate …

interaction between the observability of the cooperation of others and the absence of punishment targeted at cooperative …