We analyze the dynamics of the Japanese board network from 2004 until 2013. We find that the network exhibits some clustering with visible firm conglomerates. Ties between firms are rather persistent, despite noticeable churning among directors. Ownership relations explain only a small fraction...

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the...

Improving the regulation of banks has been at the centre of economic policy actions since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. One of the many and conceptually very different measures proposed is to improve the corporate governance of banks by setting qualification standards for banks’...

We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a...

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...

We examine the labor market consequences for directors who adopt poison pills. Directors who become associated with pill adoption experience significant decreases in vote margins and increases in termination rates across all their directorships. They also experience a decrease in the likelihood...

We analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors affects firm value. We find that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors. We...

For-profit and nonprofit organizations exist for different reasons: for-profits to generate a return on investment for shareholders and nonprofits to pursue charitable and social activities unrelated to commerce. The obligations of the boards of directors of both entities, however, are the same:...

The board of director has a responsibility to investigate credible allegations that management has engaged in activity that is not in the interest of the company or its shareholders. In the case of illegal activity, the appropriate response is likely to be very clear. Less obvious are the...