Showing 1 - 10 of 491
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599393
This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state space might be restricted, either because the policy space is restricted, or the set of rationalizable policies of the receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599396
We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599481
We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537029
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215301
We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215318
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap-talk refinement, neologism-proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215363
I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189070
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599520