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Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

Bordes, Georges; Laffond, Gilbert; Le Breton, Michel - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 469-483

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317113

The Effect of Democratically Determined (In)equality on Cooperative Behavior

Schlösser, Thomas; Steiniger, Tim; Ehlebracht, Daniel; … - In: KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und … 72 (2020) 1, pp. 33-54

We investigated the relationship between democratically determined economic inequality and cooperation in a two-stage experimental design. Although the relationship between inequality and cooperation has been studied extensively, experimental results in this area are contradictory and find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014504185

Preferences, actions and voting rules

Artabe, Alaitz; Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 15-28

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting … rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are … aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317141

Science and Ideology in Economic, Political and Social Thought

Hillinger, Claude - In: Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 2 (2008) 2008-2, pp. 1-70

This paper has two sources: One is my own research in three broad areas: business cycles, economic measurement and social choice. In all of these fields I attempted to apply the basic precepts of the scientific method as it is understood in the natural sciences. I found that my effort at using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010295300

Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-k reasoning in a voting game

Bassi, Anna; Williams, Kenneth C. - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 26-52

voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1 …, increasing payoff amounts does promote more strategic behavior in a significant manner. Our results show with complex voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369371

Voting and Power in the Small Firm: Alternatives to the One-Share, One-Vote Rule

Goon, Robert; Teall, John L. - In: Journal of Small Business Finance 3 (1994) 2, pp. 127-139

The one-share, one-vote rule applicable to the governance of most business firms provides for proportional voting power …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011310332

One-dimensional mechanism design

Moulin, Hervé - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 587-619

We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010079

Leadership in agricultural machinery circles: experimental evidence from Tajikistan

Müller, Malte - In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 64 (2020) 2, pp. 533-554

Leadership is critical for the viability of rural groups. The way in which leadership is legitimised can mediate leader and group member behaviour in the face of social dilemmas. Yet there has been scant research on leader-follower dynamics in naturally occurring groups. Highlighting the case of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428638

Information aggregation in Poisson elections

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 1-23

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189048

Peer effects on the United States Supreme Court

Holden, Richard; Keane, Michael P.; Lilley, Matthew - In: Quantitative Economics 12 (2021) 3, pp. 981-1019

Using data on essentially every U.S. Supreme Court decision since 1946, we estimate a model of peer effects on the Court. We estimate the impact of justice ideology and justice votes on the votes of their peers. To identify the peer effects, we use two instruments that generate plausibly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189739