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Intention or request: The impact of message structures
Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-13
behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our …This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver … contributing to the differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200074
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Parliamentary coalitions, an n-person game approach to politics
Fountas, Ioannis E.; Kampisioulis, Panagiotis K.; … - In: SPOUDAI - Journal of Economics and Business 62 (2012) 3/4, pp. 16-29
In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343122
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Government-sponsored microfinance program: Joint liability vs. individual liability
Mukherjee, Arghya Kusum; Kundu, Amit - In: Cogent Economics & Finance 2 (2014) 1, pp. 1-14
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) is a government-sponsored microfinance program. The scheme is based on four features: group lending with joint liability, progressive lending, back-ended subsidy, and social capital. We propose a new model of SGSY having these features: group lending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559127
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Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
Konishi, Hideo; Furusawa, Taiji - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256
but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599444
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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445
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On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
Echenique, Federico; Chambers, Christopher P. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162
We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599507
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Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 187-216
We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599509
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Ünver, M. Utku; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; … - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599511
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599527
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595
A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548