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Beyond traditional academic degrees: The labor market returns to occupational credentials in the United States

Baird, Matthew; Bozick, Robert; Zaber, Melanie A. - In: IZA Journal of Labor Economics 11 (2022) 1, pp. 1-38

States, these credentials typically take the form of licenses and certifications. Although a critical part of the workforce …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014550239

Restrictive Clauses in East-West Licensing Trade: The Case of Poland

Cieślik, Jerzy; Rapacki, Ryszard - In: Economics of Planning 17 (1981) 1, pp. 37-51

The aim of this paper is to determine how contract conditions in licensing agreements between Poland and the industrialized market-economy countries influence the long-term effects of imports of modern technology. Analysis is confined to two essential aspects of this problem. The first concerns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450063

Poland's Exports of Licenses

Rapacki, Ryszard - In: Economics of Planning 17 (1981) 2/3, pp. 53-63

Generally speaking, the structure of Polish licensing sales seems to be inadequate to the country's level of development and existing scientific and technological infrastructre. The predominance of advanced capitalist countries as recievers of disembodied technology and the marginal share of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450064

Factores determinantes de la utilización de las spin-offs como mecanismo de transferencia de conocimiento en las universidades

Beraza Garmendia, J. M.; Rodríguez Castellanos, Arturo - In: Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de … 16 (2010) 2, pp. 115-135

expanding the use of other two mechanisms: the concession of licenses and the spin-offs creation. The present work, by means of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280504

Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability

Chassang, Sylvain; Kapon, Samuel - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1109-1143

A principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail-free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536995

Kurzfristige Auktionen erhöhen Handelsvolumen und Marktliquidität an der Strombörse

Neuhoff, Karsten; Ritter, Nolan - In: DIW Wochenbericht 83 (2016) 41, pp. 987-993

electricity markets are more flexible. Auctions can facilitate more efficient trading by increasing market liquidity and … implementing a simpler market clearing mechanism to match supply and demand. Moreover, suitably designed auctions can facilitate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011546822

Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 95-118

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an … application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher … expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599366

Optimal auctions with ambiguity

Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438

A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599377

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429

We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408

Implementation with interdependent valuations

Postlewaite, Andrew; McLean, Richard - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599559