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A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
Wiseman, Thomas; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 131-173
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599537
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The dynamics of instability
Barilla, César; Gonçalves, Duarte - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 365-405
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536977
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization
Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1221-1248
ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189006
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Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
Bohren, J. Aislinn - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 449-498
investment choices. I characterize actions and payoffs in Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) for a fixed discount rate, show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536879
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Cooperation between emotional players
Andersson, Lina - In: Games 11 (2020) 4, pp. 1-16
This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200043
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Long information design
Koessler, Frédéric; Laclau, Marie; Renault, Jérôme; … - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 883-927
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536851
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
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Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations
Athey, Susan; Miller, David A. - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3, pp. 299-354
hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each … only within a bounded range. We construct non-stationary equilibria that allow traders to receive payoffs that approach … distributions there exist equilibria that yield exactly efficient payoffs for the players and zero profits for the bank, but such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599391
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Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics
Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru; Hofbauer, Josef - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 2, pp. 155-192
a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599400
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Many inspections are manipulable
Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 367-382
A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599407