Within the area of Behavioral game theory, we focus on a specific context, namely, on a game we called the Alternative traveler's dilemma. In this context, we observe that participants tend to choose strictly dominated strategies. In order to explain similar tendencies in other games,...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...

In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway...

If there exist no incentive or selective mechanisms that make cooperation in large groups incentive-compatible under realistic circumstances, functional social institutions will require subjective preferences to diverge from objective payoffs – a "noble lie." This implies the existence of...

Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass sich parallel und im Widerspruch zu konkurrenzbedingten Fragmentierungen im kooperativen Arbeitsprozess immer auch Gelegenheiten für wechselseitige zwischenmenschliche Bindungen und Verpflichtungen ergeben. Es werden Praktiken analysiert, mit denen...

Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach den Folgen von Internationalisierungsprozessen kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen (KMU) für deren Betriebliche Sozialordnung nach. Als charakteristisch für kleinere und mittlere Unternehmen wird dabei der starke Bezug von Geschäftsführung und Beschäftigten auf...

What are the equilibrium features of a financial market where a sizeable proportion of traders face reputational concerns? This question is central to our understanding of financial markets, which are increasingly dominated by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio...

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related...

This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players' future payoffs. An action profile is said to be achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path....