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Property, redistribution, and the status quo: a laboratory study

Chatziathanasiou, Konstantin; Hippel, Svenja; … - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2020) 3, pp. 919-951

We report experimental evidence showing a positive effect of redistribution on economic efficiency via the self-enforcement of property rights, and identify which status groups benefit more and which less. We model an economy in which wealth is produced if players voluntarily comply with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014504242

Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation

Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16

produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200158

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599465

A tale of two bargaining solutions

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709845

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709893

Policy makers, the international community and the population in the prevention and treatment of diseases: Case study on HIV/AIDS

Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli - In: Health Economics Review 7 (2017) 5, pp. 1-12

A four-period game is developed between a policy maker, the international community, and the population. This research supplements, through implementing strategic interaction, earlier research analyzing "one player at a time". The first two players distribute funds between preventing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011803088

Conflicts with momentum

Boudreau, James W.; Mathews, Timothy; Sanders, Shane; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12

Take the fort, then take the city. In a two-stage, two-party contest, victory in the initial stage can provide an advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a Pyrrhic victory. Our main finding is that although the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200169

Friend or foe? Co-opetition and entrepreneurial networking

Jost, Peter-J. - In: Small Business Economics 59 (2021) 3, pp. 1043-1059

We study the formation of an entrepreneurial network in an environment, in which entrepreneurs who are contesting with each other for the development of a new venture have the possibility to collaborate. On the one hand, such bilateral knowledge collaborations are beneficial because they allow...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501840

Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: Experimental evidence from Germany and China

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852710

Optimal sequential contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 207-244

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536866

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