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Private value takeover auctions with toeholds: An experimental study
Dodonova, Anna; Khoroshilov, Yuri - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10
This paper presents the results of an experimental study of takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent with the theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200102
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An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
Van Essen, Matt - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369429
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A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
Olszewski, Wojciech; Chung, Kim-Sau - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487
We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599395
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The impact of the irrelevant: Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in auctions
Peeters, Ronald; Strobel, Martin; Vermeulen, Dries; … - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-19
-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709877
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A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tâtonnement
Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 943-978
rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and … dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189007
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Information aggregation in competitive markets
Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 161-196
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189021
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Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434
potential bidder who is omitted from the auction. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than one, then optimal … mechanisms skew the allocation towards bidders with lower signals. This can be implemented via a modified Vickrey auction, where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042
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Competing Combinatorial Auctions
Kittsteiner, Thomas; Ott, Marion; Steinberg, Richard - In: Information Systems Research (2021) Ahead of Print
in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that …, even if a single auctioneer offers a combinatorial auction, competing auctioneers in a comparable setting will not. Instead …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012617840
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Equilibrium existence in games with ties
Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 481-502
We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games, and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at "ties." These games include a general version of all-pay contests,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536959
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Endogenous governance transparency and product market competition
Hidalgo-Cabrillana, Ana - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 4 (2013) 1, pp. 113-136
This paper analyzes the determinants of governance transparency. In our model, entrepreneurs optimally decide the precision of their earning reporting by trading off the possibility of expropriating profits against the capacity to attract external funding.We find that information is only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317073