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Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010

An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matt - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369429

A tale of two bargaining solutions

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point … determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709845

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189026

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

Kim, KyungMin - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 1, pp. 17-44

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599414

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599466

Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice

Braack, Malte; Henning, Christian; Ziesmer, Johannes - In: International Journal of Game Theory 53 (2023) 2, pp. 373-421

This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to … existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach … illustrate different logic of our model compared to mixed strategy equilibrium of the legislative bargaining model suggested by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015400882

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 3, pp. 975-999

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419654

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

Ponsati, Clara; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 157-179

of bargaining, where offers are made, with claim stages, where one side can commit to impose surrender on the other … both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317128

Bargaining with evolving private information

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 885-916

I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The …-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536929