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Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap-talk refinement, neologism-proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215363
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Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2021) 2, pp. 434-488
things, the comparison of various centralized mechanisms, the optimality of participants’ strategies, learning by applicants …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012627987
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Bandits in the lab
Hoelzemann, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Quantitative Economics 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1021-1051
We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189751
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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709878
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Intention or request: The impact of message structures
Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-13
This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200074
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Self-Confidence and Unraveling in Matching Markets
Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, … - In: Management Science 65 (2019) 12, pp. 5603-5618
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of labor markets. In the experiments, we …-confident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral determinant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143460
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Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks
Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Acemoglu, Daron - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 41-97
taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599505
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Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Jovanovic, Boyan; Prat, Julien - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599530
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215318
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A dynamic model of censorship
Sun, Yiman - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 29-60
We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537007