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Estimation of games with ordered actions: An application to chain-store entry

Aradillas-López, Andres; Gandhi, Amit - In: Quantitative Economics 7 (2016) 3, pp. 727-780

We study the estimation of static games where players are allowed to have ordered actions, such as the number of stores to enter into a market. Assuming that pay- off functions satisfy general shape restrictions, we show that equilibrium of the game implies a covariance restriction between each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995474

Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions

Ackerberg, Daniel A.; Hirano, Keisuke; Shahriar, Quazi - In: Quantitative Economics 8 (2017) 3, pp. 809-849

auction sites including eBay and General Motors Assistance Corporation. A buyer in a buy price auction can accept the buy … price to win with certainty and end the auction early. Intuitively, the buy price option may appeal to bidders who are risk … aversion and time preferences. We develop a private value model of bidder behavior in a buy price auction with a temporary buy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995504

A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games

Fox, Jeremy T.; Lazzati, Natalia - In: Quantitative Economics 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1021-1036

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995509

Estimating matching games with transfers

Fox, Jeremy T. - In: Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-38

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage, and matching with trading networks (trades). Computational issues are paramount. I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995511

An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games

Kline, Brendan - In: Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) 1, pp. 141-181

This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that in- dividuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri- marily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995514

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers

Andreyanov, Pasha; Caoui, El Hadi - In: Quantitative Economics 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1203-1256

If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can …-price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity-imperfectly observed by the seller-that captures this rationale and derive … perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 5.22%. Combining a secret reserve price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536901

Dynamic selection and distributional bounds on search costs in dynamic unit-demand models

Blevins, Jason R.; Senney, Garrett T. - In: Quantitative Economics 10 (2019) 3, pp. 891-929

This paper develops a dynamic model of consumer search that, despite placing very little structure on the dynamic problem faced by consumers, allows us to exploit intertemporal variation in price distributions to estimate the distribution from which consumer search costs are initially drawn. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215389

College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis

Carvalho Júnior, José Raimundo de Araújo; Magnac, Thierry - In: Quantitative Economics 10 (2019) 3, pp. 1233-1277

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215397

Identification of games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria and unobserved heterogeneity

Aguirregabiria, Victor; Mira, Pedro - In: Quantitative Economics 10 (2019) 4, pp. 1659-1701

This paper deals with identification of discrete games of incomplete information when we allow for three types of unobservables: payoff-relevant variables, both players' private information and common knowledge, and nonpayoff-relevant variables that determine the selection between multiple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215407

Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: Evidence from Thailand

Ahlin, Christian - In: Quantitative Economics 11 (2020) 2, pp. 713-759

How has the microcredit movement managed to push financial frontiers? Theory shows that if borrowers vary in unobservable risk, then group-based, joint liability contracts price for risk more accurately than individual contracts, provided that borrowers match with others of similar project...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215430

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