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Lobbying versus Corruption
Giovannoni, Francesco - In: CESifo DICE Report 09 (2011) 1, pp. 12-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696730
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599520
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Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 505-525
This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010034
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A theory of political gridlock
Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 555-586
varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election … scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have … substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010078
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Strategie Lessons from the Maastricht Criteria
Heinemann, Friedrich - In: Kredit und Kapital 33 (2000) 4, pp. 455-467
Verhandlungstheorie zufolge den Zweck, Verhandlungsgleichgewichte zu verändern. Dies dürfte die hauptsächliche Funktion der Kriterien …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014522787
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Collective hold-up
Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100
We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics, including lobbying, exclusive deals, and acquisition of complementary patents. In this context, we study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034
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Lobbying: Private Interests and Public Conduct
Polk, Andreas - In: CESifo DICE Report 09 (2011) 1, pp. 3-7
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696728
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Campaign Contributions – What Do They Buy and Should They be Capped?
Stratmann, Thomas - In: CESifo DICE Report 09 (2011) 1, pp. 17-20
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696731
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A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
Montero, Maria - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 39-56
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709840