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Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

Bordes, Georges; Laffond, Gilbert; Le Breton, Michel - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 469-483

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317113

Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice

Braack, Malte; Henning, Christian; Ziesmer, Johannes - In: International Journal of Game Theory 53 (2023) 2, pp. 373-421

This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015205196

Strategie Lessons from the Maastricht Criteria

Heinemann, Friedrich - In: Kredit und Kapital 33 (2000) 4, pp. 455-467

-Mitgliedstaats demonstriert. Die empirischen Resultate bestätigen die Vorhersage der Theorie, daß die Kriterien besonders in den Ländern mit einer … sheds light on this neglected dimension and proposes to understand the criteria in the context of bargaining theory as … boundaries. According to bargaining theory a boundary is created in order to change bargaining equilibria. It is argued that this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014522787

Collective hold-up

Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100

We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 505-525

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010034

A theory of political gridlock

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 555-586

This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010078

Lobbying: Private Interests and Public Conduct

Polk, Andreas - In: CESifo DICE Report 09 (2011) 1, pp. 3-7

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696728

Lobbying versus Corruption

Giovannoni, Francesco - In: CESifo DICE Report 09 (2011) 1, pp. 12-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696730

Campaign Contributions – What Do They Buy and Should They be Capped?

Stratmann, Thomas - In: CESifo DICE Report 09 (2011) 1, pp. 17-20

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696731

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability

Montero, Maria - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 39-56

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709840