This paper is about a model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market with free entry of identical firms and variable returns to scale. If the optimum number of active firms in the market is two or more, and the number of active firms is equal to that optimum number, then Bertrand...

Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms, especially when it comes to oligopoly theory. Experimental industrial organization, therefore, faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals...

Die Erhöhung der Benzinpreise findet in der Öffentlichkeit viel Beachtung. Das Bundeskartellamt geht in Deutschland von einem marktbeherrschenden Oligopol der Mineralölgesellschaften aus. Wettbewerbsrechtliche Maßnahmen greifen jedoch nicht, weil der Markt sehr volatil ist und direkte...

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

This study derives pure strategy Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly in which two firms produce a homogeneous good with convex cost functions and seek to maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and relative profits. The study shows that there exists a range of equilibrium prices in duopolistic...

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this...

Trotz schrittweiser Erfolge bei der Liberalisierung der europäischen Elektrizitätsmärkte lässt die Wettbewerbsintensität auf den Großhandelsmärkten in vielen Ländern noch zu wünschen übrig. Dementsprechend sind die Preise im Verhältnis zum wettbewerblichen Referenzmaßstab zu hoch....