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An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

Kim, Kyungmin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 17-44

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699204

Efficient incentives with social preferences

March, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 975-999

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635255

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative Games

Attanasi, Giuseppe; García Gallego, Aurora; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 273-298

existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316539

A tale of two bargaining solutions

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174

tempered aspirations solution, in terms of Pareto efficiency in a strategic framework. Our main result shows that the weights … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a … requires also the difference in the weights placed on the reference point to be considered in reaching an efficiency ranking. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316643

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency, and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689320

Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining : experimental evidence from Germany and China

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771180

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

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