auction sites including eBay and General Motors Assistance Corporation. A buyer in a buy price auction can accept the buy … price to win with certainty and end the auction early. Intuitively, the buy price option may appeal to bidders who are risk … aversion and time preferences. We develop a private value model of bidder behavior in a buy price auction with a temporary buy …

-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started …

This paper purposes a symmetric all-pay auction where the bidders compete neither for an object nor the object itself … but for a lottery on receive. That lottery is determined endogenously through the bids. This auction is known as chance … auction or more popularly as Chinese auction. The model considers the possibility that for some bidders the optimal strategy …

We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way … they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for …

, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also … show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule. …

I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation … that the optimal auction with budget-constrained bidders has a standard solution analogous to the one for classic models. …

better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences …. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under … which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1 …