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Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651
The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government's fiscal policy and a central bank's monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013183737
I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308618
In the context of the team´s theory, this article shows that employees will be communicated, independent of their skill endowment, have a high skill endowment. In this way, the formation teams can lead to groups whose productivity is lower than that exhibited in terms of the skills they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012260285
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628
We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704445