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Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma

Wiseman, Thomas; Yilankaya, Okan - In: Games and economic behavior 37 (2001) 1, pp. 216-242

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001619171

A model of evidence production and optimal standard of proof and penalty in criminal trials

Yilankaya, Okan - In: The Canadian journal of economics 35 (2002) 2, pp. 385-409

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A note on the seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information

Yilankaya, Okan - In: Journal of economic theory 87 (1999) 1, pp. 267-271

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001403544

Sequential choice and non-Bayesian observational learning

Wiseman, Thomas - In: International game theory review 11 (2009) 3, pp. 285-300

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008858431

Reputation and impermanent types

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Games and economic behavior 62 (2008) 1, pp. 190-210

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003669572

Reputation and exogenous private learning

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 3, pp. 1352-1357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003856435

A partial folk theorem for games with private learning

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 217-239

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582152

Disagreement leads to complete learning : sequential choice with continuous types

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Economics letters 100 (2008) 1, pp. 53-55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747276

Competitive long-term health insurance

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Journal of health economics 58 (2018), pp. 144-150

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011999278

A partial folk theorem for games with private learning

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 217-239

The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690752