these contracts. …

maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a … a class of incentive compatible contracts that can be easily characterized is approximately optimal. …

I show that stochastic contracts generate powerful incentives when agents suffer from probability distortion. When … implementing these contracts, the principal can target probability distortions in order to inflate the agent's perceived benefits … of exerting high levels of effort. This novel source of motivation is absent in contracts traditionally regarded as …

We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of … asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics … used to select correctly our parametric restrictions. Our results indicate that the loss of using such simple contracts …

incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time. …

others' ranking of contracts, also share beliefs about each others' future tastes in the face of unforeseen contingencies. …

mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed experts. This result stands in contrast with the … analysis of contracts under risk, where separation is often feasible. …

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are … contracts are designed to punish deviations in noncontractible behavior. If the equilibrium actions are observed, these … contracts are renegotiated away. This form of anticipated renegotiation results in welfare improvements over outcomes attainable …