The paper investigates firms’ behavior and outcomes (levels of cost-reducing R&D, output, profit and welfare in equilibrium) in a differentiated duopoly with process innovation. One of the important features in this paper is that spillovers operate in the R&D stage and are tied to the degree...

This paper analyzes the role of absorptive capacity in R&D spillovers through strategic R&D investments in a game-theoretic framework. In the model, a firm's effective R&D is composed of idiosyncratic R&D, which produces its own innovations, and identical R&D, which improves absorptive capacity....

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this...

This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for...

This article depicts a location game in a circular market. The equivalence results between a convex and a concave transport cost are reexamined by assuming an arbitrary length. In contrast to previous research the solution found shows that the equivalence relationship depends on the space...

The standard approach to nominal illusion in Economics sees it as a transitory phenomenon, as economic agents eventually see through the nominal veil, making the right choices. Recent empirical studies suggest that money illusion may persist, distorting real prices in a variety of economic...

Coordinating the timing and location of new production facilities is one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition, and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. The authors build a model...

This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium...