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Information aggregation in Poisson elections

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 1, pp. 1-23

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806603

Voting in three-alternative committees : an experiment

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/20, pp. 1-23

We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061937

A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives

Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/2, pp. 1-12

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613

Information in elections : do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?

Andina-Díaz, Ascensión - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 7 (2016) 3, pp. 307-339

We model an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty about the state of the world. Candidates receive signals on the state and propose a policy to implement. There are two classes of voters: ideological, who are biased towards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537537

Credible ratings

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 325-365

(individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the … average level of credibility for its good ratings than in individual rating. In decentralized rating, the ratings are again … degree of rating inflation and hence a greater level of credibility than in individual rating. Comparing centralized rating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700252

Democracy, lobbying and economics

Žák, Milan - In: Národohospodářský obzor : časopis věnovaný … 19 (2019) 3, pp. 193-210

The paper deals with the issue of lobbying, defined as a democratic means of promoting interests. The text tries to find answers to the problems in the current economic theory. The basic links are defined by using a simple graphic model, which are further examined by the SWOT analysis. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131482

Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap‐talk games

Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487

way that can be predicted by the credibility of the neologism; and receivers' behavior indicates that they understand …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751

Strategic redistricting

Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: The American economic review 100 (2010) 4, pp. 1616-1641

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747578

Agendas in legislative decision-making

Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

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