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Sanctions against North Korea : a descriptive analysis of their economic impact (2000-2020)

Zani, Simone - In: Peace economics, peace science and public policy 28 (2022) 4, pp. 333-360

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013553563

The Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game

Whitmeyer, Mark - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-21

This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty’s motives and incentives. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709265

Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119

The impact of sanctions on the exploitation of shared natural resources : a game theory approach

Salimian, Salah; Mamipour, Siab; Salimian, Sattar - In: Energy strategy reviews 54 (2024), pp. 1-8

addresses the effect of each country's share of the common resource and the impact of sanctions on the benefits obtained by both … the share of each country and the level of sanctions imposed on the interested parties. In general, each country only … adopts the policy of cooperation in the exploitation of common resources if the level of sanctions imposed against the other …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635291

Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation

Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770

Pricing pollution in a non-cooperative world

Mideksa, Torben - In: Journal of public economics plus 3 (2022), pp. 1-9

I examine a policy-making game among countries that must choose both a policy instrument (e.g., a tax or a quota) and its intensity (i.e., the tax rate or the quota level) to price pollution. When countries price pollution non-cooperatively, they not only set the intensity inefficiently, they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013486051