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Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences : a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 445-487

the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673396

Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences

Shinozaki, Hiroki - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-24

desirable properties, which highlights the strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency. In contrast, in the … case of two agents and a single object, egalitarian-equivalence is compatible with efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418154

Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps

Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 1-28

We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158937

Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

Baisa, Brian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 361-413

. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under … which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1 …) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159080

Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences : a positive result

Shinozaki, Hiroki - In: Economics letters 223 (2023), pp. 1-4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014234150

A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement

Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 943-978

asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306

Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 133-155

I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673069

Double auction with interdependent values : incentives and efficiency

Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1393-1438

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744298

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Performance‐maximizing large contests

Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 57-88

Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants’ performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex-ante asymmetric in their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159024

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