We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …

We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical …

the approach in second-price and first-price auctions, we establish our main result that there is no efficient auction in …

aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they … and in the potential activation of behavioral biases: (i) the ascending Vickrey auction, a closed format; and two open … formats, (ii) the Japanese-English auction, and (iii) the Oral Outcry auction. Even though bidders react to information …

This paper will review important topics on the subject of auction theory and mechanism design, these include … tells us that if buyers and sellers both have private information full efficiency is impossible, however Vickrey auction … (single unit auction) will be efficient i.e. will put the goods in the hands of the buyers that value them most. However, the …

I study the canonical private value auction model for a single good without the quasilinearity restriction. I assume … leads to qualitatively different solutions to the auction design problem. Expected rev- enue is no longer maximized using … supply 1. With enough bidders, it has greater expected revenues than any stan- dard auction, and under complete information …

studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple … bidders if their use does not conflict with others; this simultaneous use directly affects the efficiency of the auction. A … price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are …