Showing 1 - 10 of 2,883
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012293297
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614746
Creative accounting allows governments and, more particularly, finance ministers to somehow manage financial reports to achieve specific and possibly self-interested goals. It is usually used to hide deficits. It sometimes also helps to present financial performance as being more worrisome than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011963006
Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221
We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271439
Recently, it has been shown that the characterizations of different classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with binary range can be reduced to a common functional form. In the present paper, we investigate the reasons why this happens. We show that all the classes considered share a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271445
This article establishes versions of Moulin's (Public Choice 35:437-455, 1980) characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset of the real line. Two results are established...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505649
The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011967421
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699125
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527