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Constitutions and social networks
Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2015
have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a … social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players …, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283143
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Constitutions and social networks
Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413881
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The Bonacich Shapley centrality
Allouch, Nizar; Meca, Ana; Polotskaya, K. - 2021
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664389
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The Bonacich Shapley centrality
Allouch, Nizar; Meca, Ana; Polotskaya, K. - 2021
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584076
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Constitutions and groups
Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011991127
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Under-connected and over-connected networks
Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim - 2008
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547
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Convexity and complementarity in network formation: Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks
Hellmann, Tim - 2009
This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272600
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Under-connected and over-connected networks
Hellmann, Tim; Buechel, Berno - 2009
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279423
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Contagion in Stable Networks
Bougheas, Spiros - 2017
We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744988
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Contagion in Stable Networks
Bougheas, Spiros - 2017
We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816753