We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...

Using a representative establishment dataset, this paper analyzes the incidence of wage posting and wage bargaining in the matching process. We show that both modes of wage determination coexist in the German labor market, with about two-thirds of hirings being characterized by wage posting....

We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...

Part I. Global Value Networks & Polycentricity -- Chapter 1. Resilience and innovation in regio-global value networks - conception and de-sign (Josef Wieland) -- Chapter 2. The new ethical values of the relational market economy: Value change in the private business world and the movement...

Using both household and linked-employer-employee data we study the effects of works councils on individual sickness absence rates and a subjective measure of personnel problems due to absenteeism in Germany. We find that the existence of a works council is positively correlated with the...