Legalized parallel trade implies that an original manufacturer cannot control a retailer in a foreign country once the latter has ordered its sales quantity and has compensated the former. This paper endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent who has private information on the perceived...

We develop a model in which it is uncertainty about the future domestic policy environment that both makes international cooperation attractive and induces the possibility of a nation reneging on such an international agreement. We show, in a fairly general setting that the possibility of exit...

This paper scrutinizes the effects of investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) and national treatment provisions in a two-period model where foreign investment is subject to domestic regulation and a holdup problem. It shows that ISDS can mitigate the holdup problem and increases aggregate...

Multinational companies can exploit the tax advantage of debt more aggressively than national companies. Besides utilizing the standard debt tax shield, multinationals can shift debt from affiliates in low-tax countries to affiliates in high-tax countries. We study the capital structure of...

We analyze the implications of OECD methods to regulate transfer pricing and the role of a royalty tax for abusive transfer pricing. We show: (i) Under traditional methods, mispricing of royalty payments does not affect investment, but the Transactional Profit Split Method triggers higher...

This paper sets up an imperfect-competition model of a small open economy, and undertakes a welfare comparison of the Corporate Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity tax (ACE). A main result is that a small open economy should levy a positive source tax on capital in...

Many subsidiaries can deduct interest payments on internal debt from their taxable income. By issuing internal debt from a tax haven, multinationals can shift income out of host countries through the interest rates they charge and the amount of internal debt they issue. We show that, from a...

We set up a two-country, regional model of trade in financial services. Competitive firms in each country manufacture untraded consumer goods in an uncertain productive environment, borrowing funds from a bank in either the home or the foreign market. Duopolistic banks can choose their levels of...

This paper studies regulatory competition in the banking sector in a model where banks are heterogeneous and taxpayers come up for the losses of failing banks. Capital requirements force the weakest banks to exit the market. This gives rise to a signalling effect of capital standards, as...

We analyze the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation, where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common, central tax rate in the first stage, and then non-cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage. We show that this mechanism effectively reduces...