In a model of sequential search with transferable utility, we allow heterogeneous agents to strategically choose a costless signal of their type. Search frictions are included as discounting and explicit search costs. Through signals, if only they are truthful, agents can avoid the...

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves...

We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and six recipients that are divided into two groups of three. The proposer cannot discriminate among, but across group members....

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players form an undirected network with explicit linking costs anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent sequential network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we...

We consider the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and cannot commit to not renegotiate a chosen contract. To analyze this problem, we propose an infinite horizon negotiation protocol in which renegotiation is frictionless, executed without delay and...

We study the allocation of German lawyers to different regional courts for their compulsory legal traineeship. The number of applicants exceeds the number of available positions in a given time period in some regions, so that not all lawyers can be matched simultaneously. As a consequence some...

Games of imperfect information distribute information unevenly amongst parties. Recently, parties have been claimed to hold preferences purely over such procedural aspects. Here, I explore the impact purely procedural preferences exert if agents are without influence on the procedure itself. I...

As described in this paper, a simple matching theory is constructed to ascertain how natural disasters affect regional economic activities and migration. Section 2 introduces a simple matching theory model based on previous studies. This theory explains how the unemployment rate, a measure of...

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...

Do contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on...