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This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second-period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the rst period. The information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301478
The empirical analysis of the impact of long-term contracts on performance is challenging for two reasons: first, it is … difficult to get adequate performance measures and second, potentially negative incentive effects of long-term contracts are … countervailed by selection effects when workers with higher abilities get longer contracts. We adopt data from professional sports …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270241
Hart and Moore (2008) argue that varying degrees of flexibility in contracts induce differing reference points and …-seller-relationship with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the sellers' cost level to test these effects. We rerun their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271433
The coordination plays central role in the economics. The conventional economic theory looks at the market and enterprise (or hierarchy) as two different, separated manner of coordination of economic goods and services. However the modern organization theory, price theory and institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307588
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents binary performance level (suc- cess or failure) depends on their invested research e ort, and their choice of a research technology that is uncertain in respect of its apt- ness to generate a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301559
I consider a setting of complete but unverifiable information in which two agents enter a contractual relationship to induce mutually beneficial investments. As my main result, I establish that the famous irrelevance of contracting paradigm, that arises due to the detrimental effect of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301762
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal s evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly unverifiable message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301812
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329433
We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287878
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359340