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Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments

Schmutzler, Armin; Klein, Arnd - 2015

This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second-period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the rst period. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301478

The incentive effects of long-term contracts on performance - Evidence from a natural experiment in European Football

Gerfin, Michael; Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheusser, Gerd - 2010

The empirical analysis of the impact of long-term contracts on performance is challenging for two reasons: first, it is … difficult to get adequate performance measures and second, potentially negative incentive effects of long-term contracts are … countervailed by selection effects when workers with higher abilities get longer contracts. We adopt data from professional sports …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270241

To Choose or Not to Choose: Contracts, Reference Points, Reciprocity, and Signaling

Erlei, Mathias; Reinhold, Christian - 2010

Hart and Moore (2008) argue that varying degrees of flexibility in contracts induce differing reference points and …-seller-relationship with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the sellers' cost level to test these effects. We rerun their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271433

Use of coordination fields in food economics

Tóth, József - 2010

The coordination plays central role in the economics. The conventional economic theory looks at the market and enterprise (or hierarchy) as two different, separated manner of coordination of economic goods and services. However the modern organization theory, price theory and institutional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307588

Do Zombies Rise When Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship-Banking Model

Kaehny, Maximilian; Herweg, Fabian - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359340

Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329433

Sequential, multidimensional screening

Litterscheid, Sina; Szalay, Dezsö - 2014

We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010396799

An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation

Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert - 2014

guarantee that the firm also stays in the future. We investigate situations where contracts between a local regulator and the … undertakes a location-specific investment that is not contractible. When long-term contracts are feasible, the regulator averts …-term contracts are feasible, contracts with positive transfers in the second period cannot be implemented if the firm's investment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010396826

Contracting with Researchers

Verbeck, Matthias - 2015

We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents binary performance level (suc- cess or failure) depends on their invested research e ort, and their choice of a research technology that is uncertain in respect of its apt- ness to generate a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301559

Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages be Sent?

Göller, Daniel - 2015

I consider a setting of complete but unverifiable information in which two agents enter a contractual relationship to induce mutually beneficial investments. As my main result, I establish that the famous irrelevance of contracting paradigm, that arises due to the detrimental effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301762