Showing 1 - 8 of 8
This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories threat to embargo (potential) free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301507
In a multi-country model with interconnected markets for fossil fuel and deposits some countries fight climate damage by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. We analyze the effectiveness of such a deposit policy, when that policy stands alone or is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301606
We focus on carbon emissions control in a group of countries to explore the distributional incidence of mixed policies consisting of a joint emissions trading scheme (ETS) and of national emissions taxes overlapping with the ETS. Such policies impact on national welfares through both the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270151
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010396840
In Harstad's (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalition's climate policy consists of capping own fuel de- mand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preserva- tion. Harstad's Theorem 1 states that if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527785
We analyze strategies to conserve worldwide biodiversity assuming that biodiversity and ecosystem services are positively correlated with that share of land that is effectively protected by land-use restrictions against the deterioration of ecosystems (land-use approach). The willingness-to-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527872
This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623196
In a two-period model with two groups of countries that extract, trade and consume fossil fuel, a climate coalition fights against climate damage by purchasing or leasing deposits to prevent their extraction, and seeks to manipulate the fuel prices in its favor. The deposit-purchase policy is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892102