This study explores the effects of communication and its interaction with reputation information. Our focus is on buyer-determined procurement auctions with moral hazard in which buyers can select a bidder based on prices and all other information available. The results of our controlled...

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who wants to select an optimal subset of projects to maximize her utility. Project costs are private information and the value the designer derives from their provision may vary. In this allocation problem the choice of projects - both which...

We investigate the claim that auctions in procurement are detrimental to the buyer- seller relationship, which is expressed by less trust by the buyer and more oppor- tunistic behavior by the supplier after the sourcing. To do so, we compare exper- imentally a standard auction and a...

Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market, this paper examines the effect of price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. General bid caps reduce the maximum price below the bid cap, but also the minimum potential market price below the cap. A bid cap only for the...

Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in a market are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information in these markets affects welfare and revenues is of fundamental interest. We introduce new mathematical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...

We derive the optimal incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms to reallocate arbitrary given ownership shares among a set of agents. These mechanisms are optimal in the sense that they maximize social surplus of the final allocation subject to the aforementioned constraints and...

People overestimate the probability that others share their values or preferences. I introduce type projection equilibrium (TPE) to capture such projection in Bayesian games. TPE allows each player to believe his opponents share his type with intermediate probability \rho. After establishing...

We study a model of war in which the outcome of the war is uncertain from the perspective of the involved countries not because of luck on the battlefield (as in standard models) but because of their lack of information about their opponents. In our model there are two countries characterized by...

Efficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and,...

This article investigates the impact of societal structure on behavior in competitions that can be modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. The consideration of identity-dependent externalities, which naturally arise in the most common applications of all-pay auctions,...