We conduct a laboratory experiment of self-serving deceptive behavior and exogenously vary the level of reflection time. We find that time pressure leads to more honesty compared to sufficient contemplation time. Moreover, more reflection time increases awareness of the misreporting opportunity....

We study deception choices and deception detection in a tax compliance experiment. We find large systematic differences in individual deception abilities. Tax payers are conscious about their own deception abilities. The empirical outcomes are in line with a theory suggesting that tax payers...

We study whether individuals in a face-to-face situation can successfully exert some lying effort to delude others. We exploit data from a laboratory experiment in which participants were asked to assess videotaped statements as being rather truthful or untruthful. The statements are...

According to rational choice theory, preference orderings should be invariant with respect to the elicitation procedure. The contingent trade-off model (Tversky et al., 1988), however, argues that if an attribute of decision alterna-tives is also used as response mode (scale compatibility), then...

In previous models of (cumulative) prospect theory reference-dependence of preferences is imposed beforehand and the location of the reference point is exogenously determined. This paper provides an axiomatization of a new specification of cumulative prospect theory, termed endogenous prospect...

The present paper reports a repeated experiment on decision making under risk where subjects have to tackle the same choice problems in several rounds. We fit a simple error model and investigate how behavior changes in the course of the experiment. Our analysis complements and extends Hey...