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This paper investigates the effects of different prize structures on the effort choices of participants in two-stage elimination contests. A format with a single prize is shown to maximize total effort over both stages, but induces low effort in stage 1 and high effort in stage 2. By contrast, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329406
provision. We test our model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012099071
experiment that investigates the impact of political institutions within groups on the development of conflict between groups. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287803
effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623215
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271439
This paper investigates whether the timing of rewards affects behavior in multi-stage contests. Abstracting from discounting, theory predicts that it is irrelevant for behavior whether agents are immediately rewarded for succeeding on a particular stage, or whether the reward is delayed until...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301688
We consider a model of redistributive politics in which politicians have the possibility to raise some debt and to implement a pie-increasing reform, i.e. a reform creating a net increase in the total taxable endowment. The reform benefits occur in the future and the reform costs have to be paid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301703
In using their citizen candidate framework, Besley and Coate (2001) fi nd that if citizen candidates with sufficiently extreme preferences are available, lobbying has no in fluence on equilibrium policy. I show that this result does not hold in a model with ideological parties instead of citizen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329260
This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329446
We allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way; i.e., she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort (resp. revenue). The two predominant contest regimes are considered, all-pay auctions and lottery contests....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329509