This paper provides the proofs to the analysis of a continuous time matching model with saving in Bayer and Wälde (2010a). The paper proves the results on consumption growth, provides an existence proof for optimal consumption and a detailed derivation of the Fokker-Planck equations.

One important feature of tax reforms, in particular corporate tax reforms, is the uncertainty surrounding them. Are they going to be permanent or are they likely to be withdrawn by the subsequent government? The expected duration of the reform is important because it affects households' economic...

We develop a general equilibrium model of earnings, income and wealth heterogeneity in continuous time. We extend existing analytical and numerical methods to solve the model. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that stochastic interest rates provide a mechanism to link earnings, income...

Games of imperfect information distribute information unevenly amongst parties. Recently, parties have been claimed to hold preferences purely over such procedural aspects. Here, I explore the impact purely procedural preferences exert if agents are without influence on the procedure itself. I...

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

This paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique dataset of matched loan application and loan contract information and measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important determinants of...

Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into 'echo chambers'? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody's information...

A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in order to eliminate the opportunism problem....

I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized...

We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...