Why do some banks react to deregulation by expanding geographically while others do not? This paper examines this question using exogenous variation in locally non-diversifiable risk that banks face in their home state. As a measure of locally non-diversifiable risk we use data on damages...

The theory of relationship lending is based on the idea that close ties between borrowers and banks may be economically beneficial. Information asymmetries on the part of the bank introduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems into the lending process and may lead to lengthy decision...

The interplay between banks and the macroeconomy is of key importance for financial and economic stability. We analyze this link using a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive Model (FAVAR) which extends a standard VAR for the U.S. macroeconomy with a set of factors summarizing conditions in the...

This paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique dataset of matched loan application and loan contract information and measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important determinants of...

The paper analyzes the interaction between an endogenous capital structure and investment decision, and the incentive scheme of bank executives. We show that the implementation of capital requirements, which are contingent on compensation schemes, drive a wedge between the interests of the...

We examine the saving behavior of banks retail customers. Our unique dataset comprises the contract and cash flow information for approximately 2.2 million individual contracts from 1991 to 2010. We find that contractual rewards, i.e., qualified interest payments, and government subsidies,...

This paper shows that the abolition of state guarantees to publicly owned banks in Germany resulted in an increase in refinancing costs at German savings banks. Rather than being the result of increased market discipline, the increase in refinancing costs is shown to be driven by spillover...

This paper analyzes how a bank shareholder optimally designs the compensation scheme of a bank manager if there are agency problems between the shareholder and the manager, and how this design changes in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a problem of excessive risk-taking, bail-out...

We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associatedwith improved availability...

We argue that contingent convertible capital (CoCo-Bonds) might have perverse risk-taking incentives for banks (asset substitution problem) and discourage them from investing in positive NPV projects and issuing new equity in times of crisis (debt overhang problem). Whenever the conversion price...