Motivated by the recent concerns of the scientists participating in the elaboration of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessment reports, we study a principal-agent relationship between a politician and a researcher that captures some stylized facts regarding the involvement of...

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements...

We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. By providing experimental evidence on different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes, we establish that social preferences of players who give in standard dictator games are best described by concerns for the...

In this paper we analyze how rati cation uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the rati cation stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the pivotal...

Transparency and accountability are often regarded as crucial for good governance and the efficient organization of public affairs. To systematically explore the impact of transparency and accountability on cooperation, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments on a variation of the public...

We investigate the dynamics of voluntary cooperation to either reduce the size or the probability of stochastic losses. For variants of a repeated four person prisoner’s dilemma game, we show that cooperation is larger and more stable when it affects the probability rather than the size of the...