In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...

In previous models of (cumulative) prospect theory reference-dependence of preferences is imposed beforehand and the location of the reference point is exogenously determined. This paper provides an axiomatization of a new specification of cumulative prospect theory, termed endogenous prospect...

This paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a standard two-period life-cycle model with endogenous leisure demands in both periods and non-insurable income risks. Households are subject to skill shocks in both periods of the life-cycle. We allow for completely general...

The assessment that the implementation of efficient outcomes by means of decentralized spontaneous solutions is to be expected for private goods, but not for public goods has become part of the conventional wisdom of our discipline. This paper uses a mechanism design approach to clarify under...

In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who tries to learn the distribution of outcomes from previously observed cases. For each observed database of cases the decision-maker predicts a set of priors expressing his beliefs about the underlying probability distribution. We impose a version of...

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

In a recent paper, Koszegi and Rabin (2009) make a novel prediction about people's attitudes towards noninstrumental information, i.e. information about fixed but unknown future outcomes. People prefer to get information clumped together rather than piecewise. We use a controlled lab experiment...

Previous research shows that firms may offer excessively high (and shrouded) add-on prices in competitive markets when some consumers are myopic. We analyze the effects of regulatory intervention via educating myopic consumers on equilibrium strategies of firms, consumer protection and welfare....

Individuals exhibit a randomization preference if they prefer random mixtures of two bets to each of the involved bets. Such preferences provide the foundation of various models of uncertainty aversion. However, it has to our knowledge not been empirically investigated whether uncertainty-averse...