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Prices versus quantities with morally concerned consumers
Schmidt, Klaus M.; Herweg, Fabian - 2021
It is widely believed that an environmental tax (price regulation) and cap-and-trade (quantity regulation) are equally efficient in controlling pollution when there is no uncertainty. We show that this is not the case if some consumers (firms, local governments) are morally concerned about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013335937
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La collusion dans les firmes
Vafaï, Kouroche - In: Revue économique : revue bimestrielle 66 (2015) 4, pp. 687-702
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441666
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Manufacturer cartels and resale price maintenance
Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2020
We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with … manufacturers if they collude. We thus provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance when manufacturers collude and … illustrate the fit of this theory in various competition policy cases. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438202
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Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings : effects on product market competition
Haas, Samuel de - 2019
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes firms' choice of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287557
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Optimal destabilization of cartels
Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham - 2020
A model-based derivation of an effective antitrust policy requires an economic framework that includes three actors: a cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel behavior, at least one of these actors is always missing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012425162
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Anchoring, reference prices, and list price collusion
Paha, Johannes - 2019
The firms in this model set non-binding list prices before competing for buyers by non-cooperatively granting discounts. Each firm has an incentive to set a high list price if, for example, the customers anchor their willingness-to-pay on the list price. However, list price competition occurs if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314193
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Multi-product pricing and minimum resale price maintenance
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian - 2021
We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer then maximizes her profit through min RPM...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013328108
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How do sanctions work? : the choice between cartel formation and tacit collusion
Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2021
This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation we study their effect on firms' communication in a laboratory experiment. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332300
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Relative performance evaluation, sabotage and collusion
Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Marvão, Catarina; Spagnolo, … - In: Journal of accounting & economics 76 (2023) 2/3, pp. 1-27
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014489132
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Pigou in the 21st century : a tribute on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of The Economics of Welfare
Edenhofer, Ottmar; Franks, Max; Kalkuhl, Matthias - In: International tax and public finance 28 (2021) 5, pp. 1090-1121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012703878