Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes firms' choice of...

The firms in this model set non-binding list prices before competing for buyers by non-cooperatively granting discounts. Each firm has an incentive to set a high list price if, for example, the customers anchor their willingness-to-pay on the list price. However, list price competition occurs if...

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index...

The German petrol station market is characterized by strong intraday price cycles, which probably correspond to the well-known Edgeworth cycles. The prices go up strongly in the late evening or in the middle of the night, fall relatively heavily in the early morning and then go up and down...

We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer then maximizes her profit through min RPM...

This paper investigates short-term effects of big tech start-up acquisitions on innovation empirically. Innovation research has found a strong positive, causal relationship between VC investment and innovation. Using this insight, we can explore the repercussions of big tech start-up...

In this conceptual paper, I propose a framework for measuring the market power of digital platforms. The rise of big technology companies that act both as intermediary platforms and providers of services and goods in several markets has heightened concerns about potential economic harms brought...

A model-based derivation of an effective antitrust policy requires an economic framework that includes three actors: a cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel behavior, at least one of these actors is always missing....

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We apply this theory to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's...

We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with manufacturer and retailer competition. Because retailers have an effective outside option to each manufacturer's contract, the manufacturers can only ensure contract acceptance by...