It is widely believed that an environmental tax (price regulation) and cap-and-trade (quantity regulation) are equally efficient in controlling pollution when there is no uncertainty. We show that this is not the case if some consumers (firms, local governments) are morally concerned about...

We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is...

Carbon pricing policies worldwide are increasingly coupled with direct or indirect subsidies for emission-intensive and trade-exposed firms. We analyze the incentives created by novel forms of emissions intensity-based rebating (IBR) and contrast them with more common approaches like...

This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto...

Many studies examine the effect of environmental values on environmental behavior. In such empirical analyses it is typically at least implicitly assumed that environmental values are independent of economic preferences from behavioral economics like risk and time preferences, trust, or...