The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...

A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in order to eliminate the opportunism problem....

This paper analyzes volatility spillovers in multivariate GARCH-type models. We show that the cross-effects between the conditional variances determine the persistence of the transmitted volatility innovations. In particular, the influence of a foreign volatility innovation on a conditional...

We investigate experimentally on eBay how sellers set prices in "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) auctions. We find that the eBay format leads to prices substantially below those expected in second-price auctions. Moreover, our results reveal that the information available on eBay about buyer experience and...

Winning bidders in online auctions frequently fail to complete the transaction. Because enforcing bids usually is too costly, auction platforms often allow sellers to make a "secondchance" offer to the second highest bidder, to buy at the bid price of this bidder, and let sellers leave negative...

This paper investigates the impact of technical progress on the relationship between competition an investment. Using a model of oligopoly competition with di¤erentiated products where firms invest to reduce their marginal cost of production, I find that technical progress, which increases the...