When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Ohne eine aktive Zivilgesellschaft bleibt jede wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf halbem Wege stecken. Entscheidend dabei ist es, Mechanismen des Dialogs zu entwickeln, damit der Staat die Anliegen von Bürgern, Konsumenten und Unternehmen versteht. Darin lauern aber auch die Gefahren, insbesondere...