This paper presents a proposal for a regulatory regime aimed at reducing systemic risk effectively and internationally. Systemic relevance should be internalized with a levy (or "tax"), the level of which (or "tax rate") rises with the systemic relevance of an institution (Pigouvian taxation)....

Regulation of Money Market Funds (MMFs) in the EU requires some categories of MMFs to consider applying liquidity management tools if they breach a minimum 'weekly' liquidity requirement. Anticipation of the application of such tools is a plausible amplifier of run risks. Using a larger European...

We develop an integrated Early Warning Global Vector Autoregressive (EW-GVAR) model to quantify the costs and benefits of capital-based macroprudential policy measures. Our findings illustrate that capital-based measures are transmitted both via their impact on the banking system's resilience...

The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First,...

This paper provides evidence for regulatory arbitrage within the class of asset-backed securities (ABS) based on individual asset holding data of German banks. I find that banks operating with tight regulatory constraints exploit the low risk-sensitivity of rating-contingent capital requirements...

We analyze the optimality of macroprudential policies in an environment where the role of the banking sector is to efficiently allocate liquid assets across firms. Informational frictions in the banking sector can lead to an interbank market freeze. Firms react to the breakdown of the banking...

We estimate a multivariate early-warning model to assess the usefulness of private credit and other macro-financial variables in predicting banking sector vulnerabilities. Using data for 23 European countries, we find that global variables and in particular global credit growth are strong...

We propose a model of asset encumbrance by banks subject to rollover risk and study the consequences for fragility, funding costs, and prudential regulation. A bank's choice of encumbrance trades off the benefit of expanding profitable investment funded by cheap long-term secured debt against...

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, regulators have rushed to strengthen banking supervision and implement bank resolution regimes. While such resolution regimes are welcome to reintroduce market discipline and reduce the reliance on taxpayer-funded bailouts, the effects on the wider...

We build a moral hazard model to study incentives of financial intermediaries (shortly, bankers) facing a leverage-insurance trade-off in their investment choice. We demonstrate that the choice is affected by two recent transformations of the financial ecosystem bankers inhabit: (i) the rise of...