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A structural model of a multitasking salesforce : job task allocation and incentive plan design

Kim, Minkyung; Sudhir, K.; Uetake, Kosuke - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126814

Push or pull? : performance-pay, incentives, and information

Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864842

Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

Adverse selection and moral hazard with multidimensional types

Kwon, Suehyun - 2017 - First draft: March 1, 2017

This paper studies a contracting problem where agents' cost of actions is private information. With two actions, this leads to a two-dimensional screening problem with moral hazard. There is a natural one-dimensional ordering of types when there is both adverse selection and moral hazard....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718471