We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is asked to make a prediction which is tested against a single realization of the stochastic process. It is shown that by...

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome...

We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, on which the...

My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.ʺ Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a standard rational agentʺ? In earlier work, GulPesendorfer [2001]...

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oÞering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and...

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the...

We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders' valuations. We...