Showing 1 - 10 of 198
Incentive instruments like asset ownership and performance pay often have to strike a balance between the productive incentives and the rent-seeking incentives they provide. Standard theory predicts that a given instrument becomes less attractive when the effectiveness of rent-seeking activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349719
Theory predicts that default breach remedies are immaterial whenever contracting costs are negligible. Some experimental studies, however, suggest that in practice default rules do matter, as they may affect parties' preferences over contract terms. This paper presents results from an experiment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349720
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850863
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378080
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level. In general, 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338000
Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349214
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002256677
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003669636
In an influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that "worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him". They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348415
In an in influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) found that "worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him." They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348740