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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877

General equilibrium with contracts

Kwon, Suehyun - 2016

This paper studies general equilibrium when workers in the economy are also consumers of final goods. Once a firm and a worker are matched, there is a standard moral hazard problem. However, the firm's profit depends on the price of the good the worker produces, and the price is determined by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580675

Motivational capital and incentives in health care organizations

Berdud, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010416398

Nitpicky insurers and the law of contracts

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre M. - 2017

show how the law of insurance contracts should allow insurers to incentivize policyholders to exert an adequate level of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471

Authority and incentives in organizations

Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

The paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the trade-off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. The analysis includes the owner of a firm, a top manager and two division heads. If it is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198507

Authority and incentives in organizations

Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748623

Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2021

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings …. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that … the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697032