Narrow search
Showing 1 - 6 of 6
Cover Image
On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies
Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2012
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011731245
Cover Image
A remark on the experimental evidence from tacit coordination games
Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003911591
Cover Image
The emergence of norms of cooperation in stag hunt games with production
Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003911593
Cover Image
On the co-evolution of investment and bargaining norms
Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2010 - This version: June 2010
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737849
Cover Image
Expectations coordination on a sunspot equilibrium : an eductive approach
Desgranges, Gabriel (contributor);  … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661584
Cover Image
Egalitarianism : an evolutionary perspective
Bagnoli, Lindia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2013
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730990